Competition and Culture

How it varies from people to people

Excerpted from Transcompetition, by Harvey Robbins & Michael Finley, McGraw-Hill/Business Week Books, 1998

(c) by Harvey Robbins & Michael Finley

The two of us are Americans, and Midwesterners, at that -- the most provincial kind. So we have to work to avoid the American chauvinism that applies to competition.

To us, competition looks American. No country has erected as many shrines to competition as the USA. Competition, free enterprise, and equal opportunity are the cornerstones of their constitution and laws. Professional sports, railroad barons, and corporate raiders follow as direct corollaries.

"May the best man win" is a sacred mantra to Americans. It transmutes their highest civic value, personal liberty, into the opportunity to do the best thing people can do, in our minds -- win.

Sure, Americans talk about rooting for the underdog, and they pay homage at the base of the Statue of Liberty to the sacredness of the lowly masses they have taken in. But their strong preference is for underdogs who triumph in the end, like Rocky and the Karate Kid. If the huddled masses don't get their act together within a generation or two, Americans say the hell with them.

Deep down, Americans treasure the lessons of competition: that there is an inherent pecking order in all things, and that spirited contests between individuals and groups are nature's way of settling differences.

Other styles of competing

But while America defines a strong flavor of competition, it has no lock on competition. Other peoples have gone other ways with it, and each has developed its own flavor. Japan may not have heard of Vince Lombardi, but their sports and business contests are every bit as brutal as anything the Green Bay Packers ever did.

It gets interesting when competition overflows national borders, and the flavors are forced to mix. IBM and Fujitsu and Siemens are locked in a global contest to sell information systems and services. But each defines the contest in ways peculiar to the culture it arises in. Likewise, the world is a village market for the bankers of Berlin, Tokyo and New York to lend money to. But loan talks with representatives of Sumitomo or Daiwa will be very different from talks with Citicorp, Chemical Bank, or the Deutsche Bank.

A good example of cultural competitive differences appears in Thomas Berger's novel Little Big Man, about the 120-year-old Jack Crabbe, who lived two lives in the Wild West, one as a white man and one as an adopted Pawnee brave. The settler cultural was supercompetitive. "First come, first served" was the essence of homesteading. "Shoot to kill" was their method of resolving disputes. The Pawnees, being tribal, were supercollaborative by nature, and they resolved many disputes ritually. A mock battle using coup-sticks, in which the enemy is embarrassed rather than hurt, was one of these.

Both methods worked well enough within cultural bounds, but were toxic when cultures mixed. A Pawnee seeing a man with a rifle thought it was a gesture of ritual intimidation, while a white settler seeing a brave brandishing a coup-stick saw it as a clear physical danger. By the time the one culture understood what the other meant, the other was nearly extinct.

Let's look at competitive business cultures today that are clashing because of globalization.

On the one hand, we have the competitive culture that everyone is familiar with, America's. Americans believe in liberty for individuals above all else. So we are a nation of scrambling individualists, inventing, wild, often violent, and often a bit confused -- but extraordinarily vital, because self-interest compels us to differentiate like mad. We affiliate -- but ever so loosely. We long ago invented drive-through church services, and have moved on to even looser vehicles of connectedness -- cell-phones, e-mail, and car-fax.

But compare the way Americans connect in business versus the collaborative style of doing business in Japan. When the Japanese industrial breakthrough occurred in the 1970s, books were written about Japan being a "samurai nation." Americans, who had done battle with the Japanese fairly recently, and were aware of how ferocious they could be, took samurai to mean "warrior," as in all the samurai swords brought home by GIs. Conclusion: the Japanese were warriors who were going to hack us to bits, Toshiro Mifune-style.

What we neglected to do was look up the word samurai in the dictionary. Its meaning is simply "to serve." In Japan's collaborative culture, there is no aspiration as lofty or as ennobling as the humble process of serving others. This collaborative notion is what underlies the terrific success Japan has with its work teams, and its networks of interlocking industries (called keiretsus):

The word keiretsu does not translate neatly into English, and that is the beginning of the problem. The most common Japanese meaning is something close to the English verbs "link," "affiliate with," or "connect to."

A keiretsu can be anything from a network of thousands of companies all working for a single large firm, to something even more stupendous, a brotherhood of dozens of enormous firms, joined together -- plus all the thousands of companies that link to them. That's what is meant by the phrase "Japan, Inc."

It's all hard for Americans to conceive of. We like our big things to be discreet and object-like: Babe Ruth, dinosaurs, redwood trees, $7 trillion debt loads. We are disappointed to discover the largest living thing is a collaborative effort: a huge fungus growing on the forest floor in Northern Michigan. Altogether the thing is 37 acres across, weighs 10,000 tons, and is estimated to be 1,500 years old. But it is unphotographable -- no frame can contain it.

Anyway, it is very hard for Americans and Japanese to understand the competition they find themselves in, because our values are so different.

Differences in competitive styles may have nothing to do with the United States, of course; countries can get plenty confused without our help. Asian managers, for instance, have had a dickens of a time meshing with Mexican workers:

What happens when Asia's workaholics, accustomed to employment for life, meet a Mexican labor pool where 20 percent turnover per month is not unusual? Alan Wong, the Hong Kong Trade Development Council's director of the Americas, baldly replies: "It makes it difficult."

Asian firms cope with this culture gap in several ways. Some executives have applied a global manufacturing mindset anchored in the home country, such as Samsung Chemicals, which produces television sets in 20 countries.

Sanyo's Carlos de Orduña makes the necessary allowances. He gives a 6- to 12-month adjustment period for entry-level people. After that, workers who cannot meet Japanese quality standards either weed themselves out or are dismissed. "We hire workers who are willing to learn," he says. "We want workers who are proud to say that a television made in Mexico is good enough to be exported to Japan."

What we learn as we traverse the globe is that different people have stumbled upon different ways of doing things. Where Europe is doggedly competitive, Africa is just as determined to be supercollaborative in its approach -- possibly even as a response to European imperialism. The Shona tribe of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, for instance, are a Bantu-speaking people numbering nearly 9 million. As the Belgian and English and French and Dutch invaded Africa in the 19th Century, groups like the Shona had to hunker down in their own values to prevent assimilation and destruction.

Out of this defensive attitude arose a social philosophy called Ubuntu, which permeates the village cultures of southern Africa, and, according to South African consultant and author Lovemore Mbigi, extends to protect African people everywhere in the world, from Brixton to Harlem:

The cardinal belief of Ubuntu is that a man can only be a man through others. [It emphasizes] the need to harness the solidarity tendency of the African people in developing management practices and approaches. They have to stick together on selective survival issues and unquestioning conformity is expected from everyone on these issues.

So while Peace Corps volunteers and other well-intentioned Westerners have been coaxing third-worlders to step away from their village cultures, the Ubuntu movement has been urging them to deepen their village identities. Ubuntu is a passionate, charismatic philosophy of survival that is more ambitious than the West can know. Its dream is to become a missionary of tribal collaborative virtues to a world it deems pagan in its individualistic impulses.

And as we spin the globe and put our fingers down almost randomly in other cultures, we see that local definitions of how people connect with one another dictate how they compete as well.

Caution: the random skip around the world that follows is not a statement of conditions ruling the behavior for all persons from these cultures. All cultures are diverse and contain countless internal contradictions and crosscurrents.

In the United States, for instance, the notion exists that reservation Indians are unsuited to manufacturing work. This derives from the politically correct notion ("Everyone knows") that Indians are inescapably collaborative in nature and have no knack for competitive industry. "Factories are not the answer," insists Nancy Jemmison, a Bureau of Indian Affairs planner insists.

But the Mississippi band of Choctaw Indians, perhaps not knowing better, are successfully making money and reducing reservation employment to zero by making car speakers, greeting cards, electronic harnesses and plastic injection items.

Nevertheless, there is still some truth to these generalizations about competitive cultures, provided to us by people who have lived in and observed them firsthand:

Belgian politics enjoy none of the rowdy intellectual contention of the United Kingdom, none of the nuance-loving literary polemics of France, not even a strong national identity. The primary issue in public debate is who gets what benefits, and while commerce and money are gods, neither is served particularly well. The national infrastructure is fraying, with little renewal: Belgians have a high per-capita income and spend it generously on cars and dining, but what Rousseau called the esprit social seems lacking. Crumbling, generic, enervated, debt-ridden, materialistic -- is this Europe's future? Social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it.... The most effective organizations are based on communities of shared ethical values. These communities do not require extensive contract and legal regulation of their relations because prior moral consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust. The social capital required to create this kind of moral community cannot be acquired ... through a rational investment decision. It requires [instead] habituation to the moral norms of a community and, in its context, the acquisition of virtues like loyalty, honesty, and dependability. The group, moreover, has to adopt common norms as a whole before trust can become generalized among its members.... Social capital cannot be acquired simply by individuals acting on their own. The Hong Kong story

The great world example of transcompetitive dynamism isn't happening in Europe, or America, or Japan. It's happening along the east coast of China, which is undergoing fantastic change in the aftermath of China's reabsorption of Hong Kong in the summer of 1997.

The West characteristically did not know how to understand the handover of the British colony to China. Americans focused on issues of individual liberty. The British focused on the continuing diminution of empire and influence. Japan focused on the alarming potential of a China led by a community that knows how to compete in a way that not even Japan can match.

Where Japan enjoys a naturally collaborative culture, China occupies the neutral zone on the scale of connectedness, in the space between competition and collaboration reserved for family feeling. Though the Chinese are cheerfully international in their outlook, brilliant traders and savvy managers, they are not as given to trusting one another, except within families. As a result, the companies of Hong Kong have generally not been very big, and they tend to be very closely held, because they are based on the extended family of the owners. People inside the family can be trusted, and the obligation to hire and help cousins one may not ever have met is very high; people outside the family (contractors, customers, and unknown stockholders) are not to be trusted. This is why Hong Kong, successful as it is, can't boast big native keiretsus and zaibatsus like the Japanese. The biggest companies in the city are foreign-owned.

The question everyone is asking, of course, is: What will happen now that capitalist Hong Kong is fully Chinese again.

Our sense is that Hong Kong has always been Chinese, and that China has been striving in its own way for many years to become more like Hong Kong. The province of Guangzhou surrounding Hong Kong -- and until recently separated by barbed wire -- is an example of civic mimicry, the walled creature trying desperately to ape the behavior of the free creature on the other side of the wall. The city of Shenzhen, directly across from the older city, has obvious aspirations to one day blend into Hong Kong and become its twin city.

Though China was a Communist country for fifty years, Communism took root less well there than in the Soviet Union. The family is still the dominant power in Han China, and like a family, China itself is happy its brilliant prodigal child back.

The 1989 massacre Tienanmen Square was a nightmare in part because it ran counter to Chinese family values, which tolerates dissent within the family. It was perhaps the low point of the last 1,000 years of Chinese history. But it was also a learning experience.

There was a tantalizing report, not yet officially confirmed, that Deng showed deep remorse about the Tienanmen crackdown on his deathbed, calling it the regret of a lifetime. If that view wins wide support, China is in for some changes. Any reevaluation of Tienanmen that acknowledges the patriotism and generally good behavior of the students will shake up China's view of herself and how she is seen by the outside world. Even so, human rights won't just disappear by themselves, and democracy won't sprout up overnight. Just as important as the truth about Tienanmen is the right to disagree with the party line. As long as the Communist Party has monopoly on political ideology and leadership, it can revise history every week and it won't bring freedom.

China has felt the power of exchange-encircle-exact, and will think three times before raising its hand against its own again. But trust, of the kind so common in Japan, will take root slowly:

In the eyes of many Chinese, the communists lost the moral right to govern after the Tienanmen Massacre, and are tolerated only as long as the economy continues to perform so well. However, the Chinese leaders likewise do not trust their citizens to wield political power: the memory of the Cultural Revolution is particularly fresh in the minds of those who, like Deng Xiaoping, suffered horribly at the hands of the young Red Brigade.

While massacres may have worked so far in quelling political dissent, there is serious doubt of their future efficacy. For one, the whole world has China under a media microscope, particularly with regard to Hong Kong. In this decade, satellite TV and the Internet have opened information floodgates. If the families of the troops and politicians are able to see their youngsters being killed live on BBC and CNN, such violence may be impossible to conduct for any length of time.

Despite all the troubles, the outlook for China is bright. Mao's sick supercollaborative regime is gone, and Jiang Zemin, China's leader after the death of Deng Xiaoping, has it in his power to be China's Gorbachev and preside over the dismantling of the Brute state that remains in place, and the creation of a transcompetitive nation that will write a surprising new page about human progress, combining the best of the two worlds it knows. What China brings to the table, no other country can: the knowledge gained over many centuries of frustration and denial, that long-term survival is the sweetest success of all.

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